Introduction

Protectionism is once again on the ballot in the 2024 US election. The choice: sharply higher tariffs—and potentially universal tariffs—under Trump, versus targeted, selective tariffs under Harris. Assessing the impact of any tariff policy on inflation and growth is challenging, given the complexity and changing pattern of global supply chains. As a general rule: the more extreme the tariff, the more stagflationary it is. We see a roughly 50% chance of a “gesture” policy, 40% of selective tariffs and a nearly 10% chance of sustained universal tariffs.

Under a universal tariff scenario, we would expect bond yields to decline and US equities to fall by around 10%, with the biggest impact on retailers, auto manufacturers, tech hardware, semiconductors, and parts of industrials. Beyond the initial risk-off shock, universal tariffs are likely negative for the US dollar. Uncertainty about the election outcome—and hence, any specific trade policy—remains high. Therefore, we discuss strategies to hedge risks.

Chapter 1

Why are tariffs an issue?

The world has embarked on what is arguably the most significant structural change in 250 years, and what economists term the “fourth industrial revolution.” Over the past decade, automation, digitization, social media, artificial intelligence, and similar technologies have altered the way economies and societies function. While investor attention is often captivated by the introduction of a new technology (e.g., the 3D printer, the computing power of the smartphone, or the connectivity of modern communication), the more serious economic impact comes from the upheaval in society.

Working practices, consumption habits, and methods of manufacturing shift, changing the demand for labor, transport, and real estate. An individual’s relative income, security, and social status all change as the economic revolution unfolds. This is great for those who find themselves on the way up. For those who find themselves on the way down in the brave new world, things are a lot less satisfactory.

Individuals who see their relative economic and social status in decline inevitably want to place the blame somewhere. While the true causes are a series of complex structural changes, these types of explanations often fall upon deaf ears. The simple solution is to find a scapegoat, but in the world of scapegoat economics, some unfortunately see foreigners—who are, by definition, alien to the domestic economy—as one of the easiest groups to blame.

This then builds economic nationalism, a specific form of prejudice politics. Politicians can then infer that by restricting actions of foreign actors, they will be able to bring about a return to better times. Economic nationalism is thus often visible through trade and capital flow protectionism, as trade is the way that foreigners are most likely to be visible to the domestic voter. It is no coincidence that polls show a majority of Americans from across the political spectrum don’t believe that the US has gained more than it has lost from trade, especially among lower-income voters (see Fig. 1).

This is a global phenomenon. Economic nationalism has been rising in Europe, Asia, and the US. It means that the issue of trade protection has become politically salient.

Fig. 1: Column chart showing the share of US voters who say the US has gained more than lost from global trade

Complexity and trade

The traditional view of global trade has evolved very little over the centuries. Many voters (and politicians) seem to regard trade in quite simplistic terms—goods are made at home from domestic materials, packed onto a ship, and sold to a foreigner.

Modern trade is almost nothing like this. Two related trends have emerged over the years. First, up to two-thirds of global trade is not taking place between separate entities, but is simply moving goods around inside companies with a global footprint. The rise of global corporations with production facilities scattered across several countries means that trade may represent moving parts up and down an internal supply chain.

In part because of this, most of the increase in global trade in goods over the past thirty years has been due to increasingly complex supply chains rather than necessarily an increase in domestic consumers’ desire to buy “foreign-made” goods. This can be easily seen with the increased importance of intermediate goods (components, essentially) as a share of overall trade.

Thirty years ago, a company might import raw materials from an external supplier abroad, manufacture at home, and export a finished product to a final consumer. Today, a company’s supply chain likely involves its product passing among different subsidiaries located in perhaps eight or ten different countries before a final sale to an end user at home. This trend created large and politically significant shifts in the location where tradable goods were produced, as well as in the associated levels of employment, even as global trade volumes rose.

These changes in global trade mean that the impact of tariffs on the global economy has evolved in recent years. The economic pain of tariffs may fall on domestic producers as much as overseas companies. It means that using past trade taxes to judge the economic impact of future potential tariffs is not very helpful.

For example, US President Nixon imposed a universal 10% “import surcharge” by presidential proclamation in August 1971, with the aim of forcing other countries to revalue their currencies against the US dollar. However, this general tariff increase (the first since the infamous Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930) was accompanied by government price and wage controls which in the very short term prevented any domestic inflation impact.

Ultimately, the price controls were a disaster, triggering product shortages and helping to fuel a wage-price spiral when they imploded; it is unlikely price controls would be repeated today. Nixon lifted the tariff by the end of the year. That would leave current-day US prices and economic output more exposed to the effects of a universal tariff. US imports of goods were 3.4% of GDP in 1971, compared to 12.7% in 2023 (see Fig. 2). The economic impact of import taxes (i.e., tariffs) were therefore significantly less than they would be today.

President Trump’s imposition of tariffs on selected imports from China may be looked upon as a more modern example of trade taxation. The value of goods imported directly from China that are subject to tariffs has fallen by over 50% compared to 2017 levels. However, the value of these same imports from other countries has risen by more than the value that China’s imports have fallen (see Fig. 3).

The rest of the world has generally replaced China in supplying taxed products to the US. In addition, some of this shift in supply chains may represent the rerouting of China’s exports via third countries. An export from China that stops in Canada may have a maple leaf sticker applied to the side of the box and recorded as a Canadian sale to the US. Mexico, Canada, and the euro area picked up three-quarters of China’s lost market share in tariffed goods between 2018 and 2020. The complexity of global supply chains can make it difficult to identify and tax products that are small parts of a larger manufacturing process.

Fig. 2: Line chart showing that imports have grown as a share of the US economy
Fig. 3: Line chart showing that US tariffs diverted some Chinese imports to other countries

What do tariffs actually do?

A tariff is a sales tax that is applied after goods arrive in a country. The tax is paid by the domestic buyer—and tariffs are often applied with the intention of changing the behavior of domestic buyers. The buyer (importer) is generally a company, not a retail consumer. The buyer pays a higher price, either because they pay the tax that the tariff represents or because they purchase a higher priced (or conceivably lower quality) alternative. In theory, the exporter could cut prices in order to accommodate the tax burden. In practice, this rarely happens. Analysis of the 2018 US tariffs against China suggests almost the entirety of the tax was borne by US buyers.1

The nation in which a seller is located has little incentive to devalue its currency. While devaluation could offset the tariff’s effects, the tariff will increase import costs for the entire domestic economy (and increase the cost of imported components for use in export production, reducing the trade benefit). We therefore do not think of a tariff as being applied to a foreign country, like China, but as being applied to domestic buyers of goods made in China.

Inflation: As a tax, a tariff’s direct impact is on price levels. A tariff will produce a one-off increase in a product’s price. As such, the direct impact of the tariff is to raise inflation rates for a single year as the price reflects an additional tax burden. A tariff will not add to prices subsequently, although it may cause behavioral changes (wage demands, profit-led inflation, reduced competition, etc.) that produce second-round inflationary effects.

There is, however, a big difference between the price that is subject to a tariff and the price that the final consumer pays. There are two reasons for this. In the case of the US, less than one-third of US imports are consumer goods (including passenger cars). Almost 70% of US imports are inputs into domestic production—inevitably, given the role of complex supply chains in trade. A 10% tariff on a semiconductor used in a washing machine does not justify a 10% increase in the price of a washing machine.

Even for consumer goods there is a big difference between the import price level and the consumer price level. A lot happens to a good between arriving at a port (when the tax is applied) and when the consumer buys it. Costs related to advertising, domestic transport, warehousing, and retailing, not to mention profit margins at each stage, all have to be paid for—and these add to the consumer price. As a result, the import price for a consumer good may well be less than half the price paid by the consumer. Even if all of a 10% tax on a product sitting on the dockside in the Port of Los Angeles is passed through to the US consumer, on average that should represent something less than a 5% increase in the price the consumer pays at the store. To give just one example, almost a quarter of what US consumers spend on goods goes to pay for the costs (and profits) of the shop or website, and these are unaffected by the tariff.

Pricing power is also important. Where imports are intermediate goods, there is the possibility that the tariff will be absorbed by slightly smaller profit margins along the supply chain. In 2018, companies along US supply chains appeared to be nervous that they could not pass on price increases, and part of the tariff increases meant squeezed margins. If the recent inflation episode has changed the psychology of companies, passing on price increases may be more commonplace than in earlier tariff episodes. A specific, more aggressive form of this is the risk of profit-led inflation, where prices rise by more than is justified by the tariff. Consumers may think that a 10% tariff means that a 10% increase in the price that they pay is “fair” (when it clearly is not).

Perhaps the simplest way to think about the impact of a tariff—a tax on trade—is to consider the relative importance of imports to a nation’s economy. In 2023, imports of goods into the US were the equivalent of 12.7% of GDP. Had a universal 10% additional trade tax been applied to those imports, and had it been passed along supply chains to the consumer, that tariff would have added 1.3% to price levels in the US economy over the subsequent quarters.

Growth: A tariff is a tax, and tax increases are negative for economic activity because they imply consumers have less money to spend. It is, of course, possible that other taxes are cut to offset the tariff, making the tax revenue impact neutral. However, this may still be a net negative. A tariff is a sales tax, and sales taxes will often hit lower-income groups harder because they spend a higher proportion of their income. While an income tax cut may offset the revenue gains from the tariff, the distribution of the income tax cut is unlikely to exactly match the distribution of the tax increase represented by the tariff.

Tariffs may reduce the competitiveness of domestic firms through the impact on intermediate goods prices. A tax on imported intermediate goods (components like microchips) will increase production costs for domestic producers. That puts those manufacturers at a competitive disadvantage relative to foreign competitors. For example, looking at the tariffs from 2018/19, US users of components from China experienced a one-off increase in costs that Canadian users of those same components did not face. Canadian producers were given an immediate competitive advantage. Export Development Canada offered specific advice to help Canadian companies importing components from China that were subject to US tariffs for use in producing finished goods that would be exported to the US. The tariff could not be avoided completely, but as long as there was a sufficiently large difference between the component and the finished product, Canadian firms were making the same thing as their US competitors with lower-cost inputs.

Transnational companies that use imported components may switch production to foreign locations. That reduces domestic production and potentially domestic jobs. For smaller companies that do not have the option of switching locations, this competitiveness challenge will either threaten to reduce sales or alternatively squeeze profit margins.

Firms that use imported components specifically to make exports have a more complicated situation. They may be able to claim Foreign-Trade Zone status. The company effectively pretends that its factory sits outside the taxing country. If components are used to make goods for export, those components are not subject to tariff. This is not costless: As might be imagined, there is a lot of paperwork involved in this sort of process. But this can help to reduce the competitiveness damage of a tariff in a complex supply chain.

For example, in May 2024 BMW submitted a Foreign-Trade Zone request for its factory in Spartanburg, South Carolina to allow it to import components without tariff, which could be used to manufacture cars for export from the US. The exemptions would apply to a range of components from glass adhesives to crankshaft sensors.

Economic activity will also potentially be affected by retaliation from trade partners. As other countries put in place retaliatory tariffs, their own consumption growth will fall, thereby slowing global growth.

Chapter 2

Trade and the US election – four scenarios

Translating the rhetoric of the campaign trail into policies in so complex an area as international trade is never easy. In addition to the size and scope of the tariffs, the economic reaction to trade policies also depends on the reaction of other economies, currency markets, and monetary policy. A trade tax is like any other tax—it is a form of fiscal tightening, but the ramifications go beyond that. We identify four broad scenarios for trade that may emerge from the current election cycle in the US:

1. Gesture politics

Under this scenario, existing tariffs are retained. However, there would be periodic taxes imposed on specific products in order to make a political point or to emphasize certain policy priorities. Generally this means that domestic consumers are paying to subsidize a favored industry or sector of the economy. Because gesture politics is not a universal tariff, supply chains can adjust over time. The effectiveness of such tariffs will then fade over time as supply chains adjust, but the decline in effectiveness is likely to be fairly gradual.

The closest parallel to this is probably the current situation between the EU and China. Tariffs are being applied very selectively in industries that have political significance. Most recently the EU has applied tariffs on imports of electric vehicles from China, and has gone so far as to specify different tariffs for different manufacturers (the additional tax rate ranging from 17% to 36.3%).

Inflation: Gesture politics is not especially inflationary. Specific product prices will rise if most of the goods sold are either imported and subject to the trade tax, or have a relatively high proportion of components subject to the trade tax. However, narrowly applied tariffs will allow for a certain amount of rerouting of supply chains to avoid the full effect of the tariff. The initial price increase (when existing supply chains are being used) may even partially reverse as alternative supply chains or tariff avoidance measures are implemented.

Growth: Raising taxes is a drag on growth, and tariffs are no exception to this. However, with gesture politics the effect is likely to be quite limited. Tariffs under gesture politics tend more to the symbolic and are unlikely to create dramatic shifts in overall economic activity. While they can present more problems for a specific sector, they are unlikely to have a major impact on overall growth.

Retaliation: Retaliation is likely, but will probably be proportional. Gesture politics is a form of trade restriction aimed at appeasing domestic political sentiment. In such cases, neither side is likely to want a significant escalation of the trade conflict with multiple rounds of tariffs being applied in a tit-for-tat approach.

2. Selective tariffs

Selective tariffs are a broader application of trade taxes than those that occur with gesture politics. Gesture politics are more focused on a single sector—whatever the political focal point is at a particular moment in time. Selective tariffs are more likely to target the broader practices of a country and apply across multiple sectors. The 2018/19 US tariffs against China (and China’s retaliation) are a reasonable example of this pattern.

Inflation: Because selective tariffs tend to be applied against a single country, and generally not against all imports from that country, we see a reasonable chance of evasion by rerouting production and deliveries. For example, a US tariff on microchips from China could be offset by exporting those microchips to a factory in Canada where the chips are used to manufacture consumer electronics. The subsequent electronic product may be exported to the US without the selective tariff being applied. The other option (which may be a political aim of the tariff) is that target country exporters are replaced with exporters from non-tariffed countries, as eventually happened with China’s exports to the US in the wake of the 2018/19 US tariffs when Mexico, Canada, the euro area, and Vietnam took over much of China’s market share of US imports.

Clearly, the wider the range of goods included in selective tariffs, the greater the risk of a general price level change. The higher the number of countries subject to selective tariffs, the harder it is to evade the tariffs through supply chain switching (and thus the greater the risk of price changes). Overall, selective tariffs will increase price levels but less than the tariff alone might imply.

Growth: Simplistically, the net amount of tariff revenue raised is a rough indicator of how much GDP will decline after a tariff is imposed, but that is likely to underestimate the negative growth impact. Because selective tariffs are limited in scope, the drag on growth depends on a balance of different factors:

  1. Which goods are subject to tariff (luxury items or basic goods),
  2. How easy it is to evade the tariff, as it is not a universal tariff,
  3. What other taxes are cut to offset the tariff revenue.

The more that there is a net burden on lower-income households, the more likely it is that domestic consumption will be weaker, and the more probable it is that economic activity will decline. If luxury items are subject to a tariff, there is a greater chance that higher-income consumers will maintain spending by reducing savings, which is generally growth neutral. A tariff on basic goods is more likely to hit lower-income consumers with less access to savings, creating more damage to aggregate economic growth.

The selective nature of the tariff means that tariff evasion is more likely. The more that tariffs can be evaded through rerouting supply chains, the less damage there will be to growth. And finally, the nature of any offsetting tax cuts must be considered. If tax cuts are designed to help those most negatively affected by the tariff increase, the damage to growth will be more limited.

Because selective tariffs are likely to include components (rather than finished products, as components form the majority of global trade), there is a risk to domestic corporate competitiveness. If companies respond by moving production overseas (as happened with some of the 2018/19 US tariffs), that becomes a negative for domestic growth and potentially employment. However companies operating in a Foreign-Trade Zone, which account for about 5% of US exports, will have less reason to shift production (though administrative costs will increase). For some sectors, like autos, the Foreign-Trade Zone is a significant way of avoiding trade taxes.

Retaliation: Retaliation is almost certain in the wake of selective tariffs. Of course, the retaliation is only to be expected from the country that is subjected to tariffs, and the pattern of trade between that country and the taxing country will dictate the economic impact. Selective tariffs are likely to have more of a political focus to them; the retaliating country will be seeking to change the domestic policies of the taxing country, with the aim of bringing about policy change rather than inflicting economic harm. This means that tariffs may be directed towards industries that matter to voters, rather than to industries that dominate the export landscape. China’s decision to slap tariffs on imported Kentucky bourbon and Harley Davidson motorcycles from the US was a direct response to the US decision to apply tariffs on imported steel and aluminum.

Other implications: All things being equal, the tax revenues from tariffs will reduce a government's deficit. However, this is not necessarily permanent. Revenue from income taxes is fairly stable. It will, of course, move with the economic cycle, but it can be predicted for any given level of economic activity. Selective trade tariffs are unstable and the revenue earned is likely to decline over time as supply chains shift. The revenue earned is stable only if supply and demand patterns do not change. Therefore, the risk is that an initial improvement in the taxing country’s fiscal position weakens within a couple of years as import patterns shift.

A more serious fiscal position might arise if tariff revenues were used to finance other tax cuts. For instance, income tax reductions are likely to lead to a more lasting decline in revenue (because their implication is politically difficult to reverse), while the shifting trade patterns suggest that a selective trade tariff only lasts as long as trade patterns remain stable. What starts out with the appearance of fiscal balance can shift into a larger fiscal deficit over time.

Retaliatory tariffs and declining competitiveness caused by higher component prices may also reduce other sources of tax revenue. This will depend on how easy it is for the country to evade the retaliatory tariffs—the mirror image of what happens to domestic tariff revenues.

3. Universal tariffs

A universal tariff, like that applied by US President Nixon in 1974, has a very important distinction from selective tariffs. Under a universal tariff, it is not possible to legally evade the tariff. Shifting the source of components or changing production locations will not help, as all imports into a country are subject to the tariff.

Inflation: The initial impact on prices of a universal tariff is straightforward. Unless profit margins are very high, the price increase is likely to be passed on completely to the end consumer. The tariff is a well-publicized external shock which consumers can be forced to accept. The ultimate impact (taking into account components, basic materials, and finished consumer goods) should be the percentage increase in the tariff multiplied by the share of imports in the economy. Thus a 10% universal tariff applied to imports to the US should raise overall price levels in the US economy by 1.3%. The direct effect is a one-time price level change.

However, there is a real risk of profit-led inflation adding to the price level increases in this situation. A universal tariff is a high-profile media story, and is likely to become what economists call a “dominant narrative.” A consumer who hears about a 10% tariff is likely to believe that it is “fair” that consumer prices rise by 10%. However, the tariff is being levied quite a long way up the supply chain and the consumer price level increase from a 10% tariff should be less than half that. However, the popular perception that a 10% tariff equals a 10% consumer price level increase may allow wholesalers and retailers to improve their own profit margins.

If there is a profit-led price increase on top of the tariff increase, then obviously the change in inflation will be more dramatic. Even if profit-led inflation is confined to finished consumer goods only, this would suggest that a US universal tariff of 10% would raise price levels by 1.7%.

As a one-off tax increase, a universal tariff does not have to produce inflation in subsequent years; further price changes would require some other cause. Because of the growth implications (below) it is unlikely that there would be a strong pay bargaining position for workers, making a wage-price spiral less likely. However, there would be shifts in the level of competition in the domestic economy with foreign market share declining. Less competition may lead to higher inflation. The US 2018 washing machine tariffs are an example of this. These were a universal tariffs applied to a single product. Despite shifts in supply chains (with increased US production) the tariffs reduced competition. US washing machine price levels rose far more than similar price measures in other countries. Once the tariffs ended in February 2023, US washing machine prices converged towards those of other industrial countries. However, the damage to competition wrought by the tariffs means that US relative price levels are still above those paid in other countries (see Fig. 4).

Fig. 4: Line chart showing that Americans paid higher prices for washing machines after tariffs were imposed

Growth: A universal tariff is likely to drag growth lower via three mechanisms:

  1. Reducing domestic consumption,
  2. Reducing competitiveness of domestic producers,
  3. Impacting exports through competitiveness and retaliatory measures.

Lower-income consumers will be harder hit by a trade tax than higher-income consumers, because sales taxes are inherently regressive. Because lower-income consumers spend a higher proportion of their income, consumer spending is reduced. Unless very carefully constructed, tax cuts implemented in conjunction with tariffs are more likely to favor higher-income consumers who have a higher propensity to save.

Firms that rely on imported components will experience an increase in manufacturing costs. Costs will increase with the tariff, and this will reduce the domestic price advantage that a tariff offers. For example, a 10% universal tariff would increase the cost of US washing machine components. It would also increase the price of imported washing machines. If (hypothetically) 30% of the manufacturing cost of a US washing machine is made with imported components, the 10% universal tariff would increase the cost of a US washing machine at the factory gate by 3%. That has to be compared to the cost of a foreign washing machine at the docks (the same point in the supply chain) increasing by 10%. While there is a relative price advantage for the US manufacturer (their costs rise by less than for the importer), there is still an absolute price increase. Fewer people will be able to afford domestic-made washing machines as the foreign component element will add to those prices.

Retaliation: A universal tariff is almost certain to lead to a universal retaliation—and an equal tax increase is likely to be imposed on foreign consumers of domestic manufactured goods. This is not what happened with the Nixon shock in 1971, but that was a universal tariff with a very specific aim (currency revaluations). Although retaliatory tariffs were not imposed while foreign exchange negotiations were underway, retaliatory tariffs were being planned in case these negotiations had not led to a lifting of the Nixon trade tax.

While very specific items may be excluded, it is highly likely that a universal and indiscriminate trade tax by one country will be met with an equal trade tax in all other countries. As with selective tariffs, this may be tweaked so as to maximize the political damage. The more retaliatory tariffs are tweaked, the greater the risk of an escalating tit-for-tat trade war.

Other implications: A universal trade tariff is a very aggressive move; Nixon tariff aside, this has not been seen in advanced industrialized economies in the post-war era. While the tariff would be directed at goods, it may have implications for global capital flows. Countries that initiate a trade tax process are generally current account deficit countries. Current account deficit countries export assets to be able to import goods and services. One consequence of this is that foreigners may own a lot of the tariff country’s assets. That gives foreign governments a potential source of leverage.

In 1995, US President Clinton’s administration was on the brink of a significant trade conflict with Japan. One of the concerns that began to emerge at that time was that the Japanese government might pressure Japanese investors to sell their holdings of US financial assets. The US dollar fell sharply as the dispute continued. Global capital flows are more important today than they were thirty years ago, and weaponizing capital flows in a trade war is a real threat. A decline in US asset values caused by capital flow shifts would have negative effects on US consumers via the wealth effect and possibly higher mortgage rates.

4. Extreme tariffs

In the US, an extreme form of trade taxation has been suggested—not perhaps entirely seriously—as worthy of consideration. This is the idea of scrapping income tax and replacing the lost revenue with a suitable tariff rate. While countries have depended on tariff revenues in the past, including the United States in the nineteenth century, depending on such revenues is normally associated with far smaller governments than any modern society has. The tariffs were also applied to a very different, less integrated trading system.

It is hard to know what level of tariff would have to be applied to generate enough revenue to offset US income tax receipts. This is because the volume of trade would react violently, reducing the revenue by reducing the tariff’s tax base. The economic hit to growth would be sizeable and presumably also affect other possible tax revenues (including state and local tax revenues). To put some context on the idea, in 2023 mercantile imports into the United States were USD 3.1tr. and individual income taxes raised USD 2.2tr. Replacing income tax would require a tariff tax increase in excess of 100% and probably closer to 130% to 150%.

The scenario of replacing income taxes with exceptionally high tariffs is unlikely, but a more dramatic universal tariff is possible if economic nationalism takes hold. Several countries have demonstrated that rampant populism can lead to counterproductive economic policies and self-inflicted harm: the UK voted to increase barriers to trade in a national referendum, for instance. In the event that a universal tariff provoked a tit-for-tat retaliation from other countries, the extreme tariffs would be the direction of travel.

Inflation: The price level increase in this scenario would be extreme, at least initially. However, reported inflation would rapidly cease to reflect inflation reality as consumers would shift consumption significantly (and some goods may not be available at all because of the ensuing supply chain disruption). The fixed weights of different goods in the inflation basket would not match up to this adjusted consumption pattern. While the tariff would affect price levels in a one-off move, it is quite possible that there would need to be a sequence of tariff increases in order to raise the required revenue if tariff revenue were to replace a tax on income (and with the volume of imports falling).

The extreme nature of this sort of price move would also likely produce second-order effects. Anyone who has wage bargaining power would be sure to exercise it. Small businesses in non-traded sectors would also likely raise prices, e.g., the self-employed plumber or the nail salon pushing up prices so that their owners can maintain their real living standard.

Growth: Although it is possible that the extreme tariff scenario is tax-revenue neutral (income tax cuts offsetting the increase in taxes on trade), the combination of a) almost certain aggressive retaliation and b) the redistribution of the tax burden will make this a negative for growth. The motive for extreme tariffs (i.e., revenue raising) gives the tax an aura of permanence. If companies do not regard tariffs as a short-term negotiating tactic, they are likely to start to restructure their businesses in a way that would reduce potential growth in the US. The exit of the UK from the EU (also regarded as permanent, and increasing trade barriers in a far less aggressive manner) hints at potential implications.

Retaliation: In such an extreme scenario the United States would face significant retaliation. This may not be a universal tariff, as countries would prioritize US-produced goods where there are few alternative sources. But there would be a relatively swift adjustment of supply chains, and there are also relatively few areas of modern trade where the US has the sort of market dominance that provides immunity from retaliation.

More seriously, from the US perspective, at some point the dollar would almost certainly lose reserve status. There are many motives for holding a specific currency in reserve—rule of law and liquidity being significant. But ultimately there has to be an assumption that the reserve holder will want to buy the output of the reserve currency country in the future. If there is dramatic trade war between the US and the rest of the world, this assumption becomes implausible. The US has, for many years, exported its assets (often its government bonds) to purchase the goods exports of other countries. If the US seeks to effectively halt the purchase of foreign goods, foreigners are likely to respond by halting the purchase of US assets.

Other implications: Any attempt to replace income tax (broadly progressive) with a sales tax (broadly regressive) would increase inequality in a country. The social implications of this would be quite negative, and it is possible that social mobility would be further reduced.

Chapter 3

Economic and financial market impact of higher tariffs

The consequences of tariffs for the economy

The trend toward protectionism is likely to continue regardless of who wins in November, but the US election has implications for the scale and scope of potential measures. Former President Trump has expressed skepticism regarding foreign entanglements, and a preference for bilateral negotiations over joint action. He has also proposed a universal tariff of 10% on all imports into the US and 60% on imports from China. By contrast, Democratic nominee Kamala Harris’ foreign policy will likely seek to preserve the transatlantic alliance and leverage traditional institutions to promote US interests. Nevertheless, the Biden-Harris administration has overseen the introduction of targeted tariffs on imports of Chinese electric vehicles, advanced batteries, solar cells, steel, aluminum, and medical equipment.

We think the status quo for tariffs is highest under a Democratic administration, but we still see a one-in-five chance of selective tariffs being imposed (see Fig. 5). By contrast, we view selective and universal tariffs as far likelier under a Republican administration given the stated views of both the presidential and vice presidential candidates. Universal tariffs become more likely in a Red Sweep, as such a scenario raises the chances that a presidential declaration of a national emergency would go unchallenged by Congress (see “Are universal tariffs constitutional?” for more information).

Combining this with our expectations about specific election outcomes, we see a roughly 50% chance of a “gesture” policy, 40% of selective tariffs and a nearly 10% chance of universal tariffs.

In thinking about the economic impact, we focus on the two higher-impact scenarios involving selective and universal tariffs. In the accompanying table, we forecast the cumulative impact to GDP over three years relative to a baseline for a selection of regions and countries. We assume the following:

  • Under selective tariffs, we apply a 15% tariff to specific sensitive imports, which would allow some trade to reroute and thereby avoid tariffs. This is similar to Trump’s first-term tariffs.
  • Under universal tariffs, we apply a 10% tariff to all imports into the US regardless of origin, meaning rerouting is not a practical option.

Three key observations stand out:

  1. A universal tariff will be more serious than a selective tariff because it cannot legally be circumvented.
  2. The economic impact to exporters should be measured by trade in value added, not absolute export volumes.
  3. Estimates depend on perceptions of how permanent the trade taxes would be, retaliation, policy response, etc. The process is somewhat reminiscent of trying to forecast the economics of the pandemic lockdowns in terms of complexity and multiple outcomes.

Election outcomes and tariff scenario probabilities, in %

Election outcome

Election outcome

Gesture

Gesture

Selective

Selective

Universal

Universal

Extreme

Extreme

Election outcome

Red Sweep

Gesture

10%

Selective

60%

Universal

25%

Extreme

5%

Election outcome

Trump/Divided Congress

Gesture

10%

Selective

75%

Universal

10%

Extreme

5%

Election outcome

Harris/Divided Congress

Gesture

80%

Selective

20%

Universal

0%

Extreme

0%

Election outcome

Blue Sweep

Gesture

80%

Selective

20%

Universal

0%

Extreme

0%

Note: The scenario corresponds to where we end up. If, for example, Trump were to implement temporary universal tariffs but then de-escalate to selective tariffs, the scenario outcome would be “selective tariffs.” Universal tariffs may require congressional approval, which explains the low probability of universal tariffs in our Red Sweep scenario and an even lower probability in the case of Trump/divided Congress.

Source: UBS

Cumulative impact to GDP over three years in two tariff scenarios, in %

Region

Region

Selective

Selective

Universal

Universal

Region

US

Selective

–0.3% to –0.5%

Universal

–1.0% to –1.5%

Region

China

Selective

–0.5% to –0.7%

Universal

–0.6% to –0.9%*

Region

APAC (ex Japan)

Selective

–0.8% to –1.6%

Universal

–1.2% to –1.8%

Region

Japan

Selective

–0.4% to –0.6%

Universal

–0.7% to –1.2%

Region

Euro area

Selective

–0.2% to –0.5%

Universal

–0.5% to –1.0%

Note: Considered independent of proposed US tax law changes and other large macroeconomic policy proposals, and also assumes a like-for-like reciprocation.

*If a Red sweep materializes and if the US imposes a targeted 60% tariff on all imports from China, with a universal 10% tariff on the rest of world, we would expect cumulative Chinese GDP to decline 2% to 3% versus baseline.

Source: UBS

Are universal tariffs constitutional?

Article 1 of the US Constitution grants exclusive authority to Congress “to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.” Congress is also explicitly granted authority “to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”

However, starting in the 1930s—and to a more significant degree after 1960—Congress delegated increasing authority to the president to manage trade. Congress did not—and cannot—permanently cede constitutional authority to the executive branch, but US presidents have accumulated greater authority over trade practices. This is usually accomplished on the basis of national security, where presidential authority is extraordinarily broad.

For a universal tariff, the Trump administration would likely rely on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA). The relevant section says the president can declare a national emergency “to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States.”

Once the national emergency is declared, the president can then “investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of…or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country…has any interest…respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” In doing so, the president must “in every possible instance, consult with the Congress before exercising any of the authorities granted by this chapter and shall consult regularly with the Congress so long as such authorities are exercised.”

The language governing consultation with Congress is imprecise, and likely would be litigated, but former president Trump could rely on this statute to initially impose a universal tariff. An emergency declaration by the president could face judicial scrutiny. In a Red Sweep scenario, Congress could pass a resolution in support of the emergency declaration, which might sway the federal courts to uphold the presidential authority. Conversely, if the Democrats hold the House and pass a resolution stating that the president has exceeded authority, the court might declare the move out of scope.

Investment implications of universal tariffs

The selective tariffs imposed during Donald Trump’s first presidency occurred alongside a Federal Reserve (Fed) that, at least initially, was steadily raising the fed funds rate from post-global-financial-crisis lows. Then, as now, the Fed was also shrinking the size of its balance sheet in its first round of quantitative tightening. Long-end bond yields declined steadily from late 2018 to the middle of 2019 as economic activity softened when the Fed paused rate hikes and eventually shifted to rate cuts (see Fig. 7). According to a Federal Reserve staff research report looking at the financial market impact of tariffs during this period, US stocks declined on days when the US administration and Chinese officials announced meaningful new trade protections (see Fig. 8). Moreover, the most-affected companies underperformed those that were less affected.2

This recent historical precedent offers some limited directional insight into the short-term impact of selective tariffs on the economy and financial markets, but the economic shock from the global COVID-19 pandemic short-circuited any potential understanding of the long-term implications. In our view, a more aggressive move to universal tariffs—admittedly a lower-probability outcome in our assessment—poses much greater downside risk to the US economy and financial markets. Even a short-term imposition of universal tariffs would likely disrupt trade flows, raise uncertainty and undermine investment, with direct consequences for financial markets.

Fig. 7: Line chart showing that bond yields initially rose in 2018 and then fell as the Fed ended rate hikes
Fig. 8: Line chart showing that US stocks reacted negatively to the 2018/19 US-China tariff announcements

Interest rates: In our view, the reduction in economic activity due to universal tariffs is bullish for US Treasuries. Under the universal tariff scenario, slower economic growth will likely outweigh the impact of a short-term rise in inflation expectations on interest rates. We see lower US rates with 2-year Treasury yields falling to 2% to 2.5% and 10-year yields declining towards 2.5% to 3%. This forecast assumes lower growth rather than higher short-term inflation as the primary driver.

We expect the Fed will turn more dovish than hawkish to prevent a recession and larger downside risks to growth, and will look through the short-term inflationary consequences of tariffs. Currently, market pricing reflects expectations for 200-basis points of rate cuts and a terminal rate of 3.3%. We do not believe that the potential short-term rise in inflation expectations will prevent the Fed from cutting rates unless there is another variable pushing inflation higher, such as rising wages or housing costs.

Although the bond market may initially sell off on the higher inflationary impacts of tariffs, we see the trend over the medium term to be toward lower rates, as the higher cost of imported items weighs on growth, consumer spending and productivity.

Equities: The implementation of a 10% universal tariff, as well as corresponding retaliatory measures by US trading partners, would likely lead to downside pressure on US equities. Our economists’ estimate of a cumulative 1-1.5% drag on US GDP growth in this scenario, translating into roughly a mid-single-digit decline in the expected level of S&P 500 profits. Tariffs may also lead to an increase in policy uncertainty, which would weigh on US stocks. Consequently, implementation of universal tariffs could lead to a ~10% pullback in US equities. We caveat that it is difficult to estimate the impact with precision; changes in consumer and corporate behavior, as well as currency fluctuations due to the tariffs (see discussion below), will be important drivers of the ultimate size of the downside in US stocks.

Companies would be impacted both from a higher cost of imported goods and higher tariffs on exports. A higher cost of imports would most likely impact retailers, automotive manufacturers, tech hardware, semiconductors, and parts of industrials. In terms of US exports, many US multinationals produce goods in the markets in which they are sold, rather than export them from the US. Still, automotive manufacturers and some industrials do export from the US and would be negatively impacted. On the other hand, purely domestic companies that compete with imports, such as steel producers, would stand to benefit.

Outside the US, cyclical and trade-oriented equity markets would probably suffer most in this risk-off environment, while we expect defensive markets with a strong domestic exposure would be more resilient.

  • China: With close to 30% of its production exposed to the US, the Chinese consumer electronics industry would be most at risk, followed by traditional manufacturing industries. However, despite the numerous headlines, the Chinese electric vehicle and renewable power supply chains have limited exposure to the US.
  • Japan: Japan is a highly cyclical market that would likely come under pressure in a risk-off environment. In terms of revenues, the US accounts for about 10% of the Topix sales. This rises to over 30% for automobile and pharma sectors. Although a significant fraction of these sales would be exempt from tariffs given they are produced in the US, these sectors are likely to be the most impacted.
  • Europe: With almost 25% of STOXX 600 sales coming from the US, Europe would also be vulnerable. Consumer and technology sectors would be among the most vulnerable sectors in our view.

Currencies: In the case of a universal 10% tariff, we would expect the USD to initially gain ground on a broad basis. This can be explained by two factors. First, such a move would most likely come with a risk-off move in global markets, leading to safe-haven-type flows into the USD. Second, the USD is likely to gain against its major trading partners, whose exports to the US could take an initial hit from the tariff announcement with a negative outlook on their respective economies.

The positive short-term USD impact has its limits, both in magnitude and duration. Besides a currency adjustment, some part of the higher cost is likely to be borne by US consumers, while the other part would be absorbed by lower corporate margins. This leaves us with three absorbing forces of a potential tariff increase. If we then consider that substitution forces are limited in the very short run, the impact to trade flows has its limits as well. So where does this leave us on the USD impact? As a base line, we would expect the USD to gain ground in the low-single digits—assuming an equal absorption of the tariff costs.

Beyond the initial shock effect, US tariffs ar e likely to be

USD negative as time progresses. With a high probability, the rest of the world would probably retaliate with a 10% tariff against US imports, while not increasing tariffs on their other trading partners. With the US being confronted by 10% tariffs from all its trading partners while these trading partners only feel the pain on their US imports, keeping the remaining imports unaffected, the US economy could face greater disadvantages. If this results in a larger US trade deficit, we expect the USD to come under pressure. Since trade flows form a rather small part of global USD trading volumes, broader financial market dynamics should play a bigger role in the trajectory of the USD. Hence, it is challenging to quantify the net impact of universal tariffs on the USD over the longer term.

Overall: We think investors are best advised to avoid significant portfolio shifts today based on predictions about the election outcome a few months from now. Uncertainty about the election and hence about any specific trade policy remains high. We therefore favor various strategies to hedge risks. For example, gold can be an effective hedge against concerns over geopolitical polarization, the US fiscal deficit, or a weaker US dollar. Similarly, the Swiss franc offers safe-haven qualities amid political uncertainty in the US and Europe.

We also see a potential portfolio role for structured investments with capital preservation or yield-generating features, for single stocks or for cyclical sectors like energy, industrials, and financials.

While the short-term path for global trade policy remains uncertain, it seems fair to assume more protectionism and obstacles for free trade over the medium term. This could accelerate investment trends like friendshoring and nearshoring. Against this, regional and sectoral diversification remains a key element of any investment portfolio. Sectors that benefit from nearshoring are, for example, infrastructure and robotics, as countries build up their own production capabilities.

Endnotes

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